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Abstract 
The IoT systems encounter more serious issues of security, reliability and availability. In this paper, we propose an 
autonomic agent trust model to decrease security concerns, increase reliability and credibility and ensure information 
collecting, sharing and processing in dynamic IoT environments. In order to build the credibility protection model for 
IoT systems, agents and agent platforms have to be built on all nodes. Agent-based node in IoT systems is 
independent, self-governing software and hardware integrated system. Introducing the agent technology to build 
systems could manage resources and regulate actions of node in order to maximize the benefit of the whole IoT 
system. Firstly, we analyze on the credibility of IoT systems and explain why IoT systems are difficult to achieve safe 
and reliable computing and service quality assurance mechanisms. Secondly, we provide the architecture of trustable 
agent and agency. After that, we propose a novel architecture named TAEC (Trustworthy Agent Execution Chip), 
which is to use the high-security, cost-effective software and hardware platform for the safe operation of Agent. The 
proposed approach is to install TAEC on each sensor node, which provides autonomic trusted hardware execution 
environment for agents. 
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1. Introduction 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is an emerging paradigm shaping our current understanding about the 
future of Internet. IoT has been emerged as one of the most important paradigmatic strings of thought 
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with regards to the future state of Internet. In a more comprehensive way, IoT transforms real world 
objects into smart objects and connect them through Internet.  In contrast with current Internet, IoT 
depends on a dynamic architecture where physical objects with embedded sensors will communicate with 
an e-infrastructure (i.e. a cloud) to send and analyze data using IP [1-3]. While there are several benefits 
arising from an IoT setting [4], there are also notable challenges such as those related to security, trust and 
privacy [5]. 
For example, current research works indicate that Internet of Things (IoT) environments have some 
unique characteristics [6,7], such as heterogeneity, autonomy, distribution and openness, which may lead 
to serious security concerns and compromised credibility [8]. For example, malicious subjects could pose 
serious threats to the normal operations of networks and damage the credibility of networks through fake 
services, conspiracy, non-cooperation and other malicious behavior [9,10]. As a whole, the construction 
and operation of IoT systems encounter more serious issues of security, reliability and availability [11]. 
In order to decrease security concerns, increase reliability and credibility and ensure information 
collecting, sharing and processing in dynamic IoT environments, we propose an autonomic agent trust 
model. 
According to the definition of FIPA (Foundation for the Intelligent Physical Agent), an agent is a 
kind of entity with autonomy, activity, mobility, reactivity, sociality, intelligence and other 
anthropomorphic features  [12-15]. Using the agent technology to build the credibility protection model 
for IoT systems, it means that agents and agent platforms have to be built on all nodes. This means that 
using a group of decentralized, loosely coupled distributed intelligent agents in IoT environments to 
achieve the high-efficient intra-or-inter-group collaboration and effective solution to solve a variety of 
conflicts and contradictions, and thus simulate organizations of human society to solve various problems. 
However, not all agents have to have all the same components. For instance, agents deployed on cluster 
servers can have more functions to accomplish more jobs, while agents deployed on sensor nodes can be 
lighter, with less function and less resource required, which means agent-based IoT systems can achieve a 
better balance between performance and function. 
Agent-based node in IoT systems is independent, self-governing software and hardware integrated 
system. We suggest introducing the agent technology to build systems with better performance, which 
could manage resources and regulate actions of node in order to maximize the benefit of the whole IoT 
system. 
Within this context, Section 2 presents an analysis about IoT systems credibility. In Section 3, we 
will present the architecture of Trustable Agent and Agency. Section 4 presents a novel architecture 
named TAEC to provide a reliable platform for the safe operation of Agent. 
 
2. Analysis on the credibility of IoT systems 
The basic elements of an IoT system are all kinds of nodes, including sensor nodes and cluster server 
nodes. IoT systems and their nodes have the following features  [16-20]: 
 Resource redundancy: the number of sensor nodes and server nodes in an IoT system might be 
really huge, which means failed nodes should not affect the operation and/or the stability of the 
system as a whole.  
 Information duplication: different sensor nodes may collect information about the same object, 
which means duplicated information must be filtered to define the useful ones. 
 Capacity difference: software and hardware resources owned by nodes are very different in 
quality and quantity.  
 Node dynamic and network instability: nodes can join or leave the IoT system dynamically; 
nodes can also self-decide (autonomously) how and when will provide services, which makes 
the system very fluid.  
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 Lack of centralized control node: some IoT systems do not have the centralized control node 
which can manage the whole system efficiently. 
The open integrated IoT systems are difficult to achieve safe and reliable computing and service 
quality assurance mechanisms due to the following reasons: 
(1) Codes and data of tasks transmitting in heterogeneous networks may be attacked or stolen by 
malicious nodes and/or by malicious execution environments. 
(2) Viruses and other malicious codes hidden inside task programs may attack, destroy execution 
environments or network systems. 
(3) Task codes from different users may attack each other and steal information from each other. 
In order to protect the transmission of code and data, we can rely on traditional network security 
technologies, which are mature and effective. For the problem of viruses attacking execution 
environments and host systems, there is a series of research results and effective methods available, such 
as the sandbox, digital signature, authentication, authorization and resource allocation, proof code 
carrying, code inspection and audit [21-24]. However, it is more challenging to protect task codes and 
data attacked by execution environments and host systems. For example, when a task is transferred and 
deployed to a destination host to be executed, the initiator of the task would completely loose the control 
of the task, and each line of the task code must be completely exposed, interpreted and executed in the 
host system. Task executor can easily isolate, control and attack task codes. For example, a malicious host 
can extract the private code or data of the task to understand the overall execution logic, spy the workflow 
and tamper codes and data according to their own will. This especially affects those tasks which have 
private computing demands. 
 
3. A Case for a Trustable Agent model 
Agent runs in the agency, which is the running container of agent, providing the communication 
service, the registration service, the management capability, the migration function, the persistence service 
and the security and reliability protection mechanism. With the introduction of the agent, all the sub-tasks 
can be encapsulated in agents. It is clear that the security basis to achieve the trustworthy virtual private 
cloud turns to protect the security and reliability on the execution, storage and communication of agent, 
which means to build the trustable agent and agency, as proposed and shown in Fig. 1. 
The proposed Trustable Agent consists of three parts:  
 Task entity encapsulating codes and data, including Agent initial program, event handler, and 
action of implementation. 
 Attributes, states and other ancillary modules, including the Agent ID, the attributes (including 
Agent creator, creation time, etc), the states (recording the current state during the execution of 
Agent, saving gained knowledge and results, supporting the cross-platform persistent mechanism), 
ACL (Agent Communication Language), the routing table (the Agent migration path in networks) 
and the rule strategies. 
 Security and reliability protection module, including the encryption and decryption module, the 
verification code module (to protect the implementation results), the redundancy module, the 
trustworthiness estimation module, the self-destruction module (responsible for destructing 
private information of task), the trust certificate (responsible for providing authentication and the 
note of local resources when enter Agency) and the Trustable Agent interface (to keep illegal 
access away from outside to Agent).  
 
 
 
 
110   X. Xu et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  21 ( 2013 )  107 – 113 
 
Fig. 1. The Architecture of Trustable Agent and Agency [25] 
 
4. Towards a Trusted Hardware Execution environment for Agent 
 In the Agent-based IoT system, we have to embed Agents into sensor nodes. Here, we propose a 
novel architecture named TAEC (Trustworthy Agent Execution Chip). The core idea of TAEC is to use 
the high-security, cost-effective software and hardware platform for the safe operation of Agent. The 
proposed approach is to install TAEC on each sensor node, which provides autonomic trusted hardware 
execution environment for Agent. 
Agent can run on the TAEC platform to complete its tasks. The TAEC plays double benefits: 
protecting nodes and protecting Agents. First of all, the location of an Agent is changed to the secure 
operating environment of TAEC in the protection of the Agent. Sensor node communicates with TAEC by 
dedicated or common standardized interfaces and devices, which cannot get programs and data of Agent in 
TAEC. Then, sensor nodes do not have to provide Agency, while TAEC becomes the only Agent 
execution environment. Of course, TAEC still needs to send messages to or receive messages from the 
sensor node. 
Fig. 2 shows the architecture of TAEC by illustrating the following five service levels: 
(1) The top layer is composed of Agent and Agency. If an Agent migrates to the local node, it will be 
immediately transferred into TAEC through the standard communication interface. Agent can be 
protected with encryption, digital signature and other security technologies. One Agency can 
provide several individual private spaces and encryption, decryption and verification services, 
ensuring multi-Agent running on the same Agency facilities in their own space independently.  
(2) The second layer is the programming function library, which provides required functions to 
achieve a variety of tasks for Agent-based applications. The library can be added with new 
functions, modified and upgraded on demand. 
  Trustable Agent  Task Entity 
Codes 
Secure Agent Interface 
Agent ID 
Data Attributes 
States Routing Table 
Rule Strategies ACL 
Encryption and Decryption 
modules 
Verification Code Redundancy Module
Trustworthiness Estimation Self-destruction Credit Certificate 
Security and reliability protection mechanism 
Communication Service
Registration Service 
Management Function Migration Service Persistent Service 
Security Module Credibility Module 
Trustable Agency 
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(3) The third layer is about embedded operating system running on TAEC hardware platform, which 
major task is to control the operation and management of the Agent, TAEC system and software 
and hardware resources. 
(4) The bottom layer includes processor, memory, storage device, interface devices, communication 
module and peripheral circuits to achieve the most basic computing, storage and communication 
functions. 
 
 
Fig. 2. The architecture of TAEC [26] 
 
5. An Autonomic Agent Trust Model for IoT systems based on TAEC 
Fig 3 shows that the proposed model can function either in an IoT centralized-topology or distributed-
topology. Each sensor node can register its node name, network address, security requirement, and digital 
certificate. The latter is issued by the TAEC manufacturer (TAECM). 
 
 
Fig. 3. Agent Protection schematic based on TAEC 
 
The TAECM certificate contains the following information (TAECM, TAEC Type, Security 
Strategies provided by TAEC, TAEC Public Key). 
Sensor node has a copy of TAEC public key to verify the digital certificate issued by the TAECM. 
TAEC is responsible to utilize the specific encryption co-processor to generate the pair key to ensure that 
the private key cannot be spied by anyone. 
If TAECM has a good reputation, which has already been recognized trustworthy widely, the node 
owners can trust that TAECM will design and produce such equipment, and will purchase TAEC with 
Agent                         Agent                       Agent 
Agency  
Programming function library 
Embedded operating system 
Hardware, including CPU, memory, interfaces, etc. 
nodeA nodeB TAEC 
TAECM 
Proxy 
Trust Provide 
Register 
TAECM Certificate     
Ask 
nodeB 
information 
encrypted Agent 
112   X. Xu et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  21 ( 2013 )  107 – 113 
digital certificate. Agent can immigrate and locate at the remote sensor node equipped with TAEC.Based 
on the trustworthy feature of TAEC manufacturers, nodes with TAEC constitute a safe, credible IoT 
system. All nodes cooperate with each other based on trustable Agent operation on TAEC, which means 
that the trust on TAECM replaces the trust relationship among IoT nodes. TAECM can achieve complete 
security solutions, monitored by the authority, and has independent interest with TAEC buyers. 
 
6. System Construction and Performance Analysis 
From what has been discussed above, we can see that the core of the proposed model is TAEC. We 
chose the silicon chip with complete system architecture and function to be the underlying hardware of 
TAEC system, which is actually a complete, stand-alone computing and storage platform based on the 
deep sub-micron silicon semiconductor processing technology. We selected the embedded Linux operating 
system to be the operating system running on TAEC hardware platform.  Both Agent and Agency can be 
developed with the embedded JAVA technology. Here we specifically chose J2ME (Java 2 Micro Edition) 
to be the development tool. To ensure Agents not able to interfere with each other, we adopted the 
sofeware firewall technology to isolate Agents. 
The Agent Protection model based on TAEC has the following features: 
 Platform independenc. TAEC limits the Agent operating environment inside a chip, which 
makes the hardware platforms and operating systems of network nodes with TAEC independent 
of the Agent operating environment. At the same time, TAEC systems developed with the same 
development standard can run on chips produced by different manufactures, which makes Agent 
be able to run without restricting the types of underlying silicon. 
 Multi-function. Multiple Agents can run in a single TAEC chip. Different Agents can achieve 
different tasks with different functions. 
 Easy to upgrade. TAEC can keep being upgraded with new systems and installed with new 
applications through the input interface after issued. This feature allows TAEC publishers 
dynamic to response to the changing customer demands. 
 Flexibility. Agent and TAEC system are developed with the embedded object-oriented methods 
and development tools, which provides the on-chip programming flexibility. 
 Compatibility. TAEC is compatible with the international SoC standards as well as industry 
standards. This compatibility enhances interoperability of Agents and TAECs developed by 
different manufacturers, making TAEC systems easier to deploy widely in networks. 
 
7. In Conclusion 
The architecture and components of the Autonomic Agent Trust Model for IoT systems based on 
TAEC are proposed in this paper. Our future work involves researching on the proposed model’s detailed 
work procedure and its application demo. We will also plan to design a new dynamic composite credibility 
evaluation mechanism, including the credit indexes of agent and node computing algorithm and the 
credibility differentiation strategy. Finally, we will work towards a novel composite collaborative 
management mechanism based on trusted autonomic agents in order to ensure the efficiency and success 
rate of the task implementation in IoT environment. Several simulation experiments will be performed to 
evaluate our proposed model’s credibility levels. 
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